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two hospitalizations I was aware and appreciative 
of how care providers use verbal cues such as tone, 
infl ection, as well as specifi c physical movements 
as tools to help communicate particular messages. 
What I did not really understand or appreciate 
until these two hospitalizations is the need to think 
about how the message being communicated will 
be, or could be, perceived—or misperceived—by 
the individual(s) receiving the message. Informa-
tion sharing in medicine needs a contextual frame 
set by care providers to help patients and families 
calibrate their understanding of a message to the 
care provider’s intent. I have no doubt that when I 
was told my daughter looked “pretty good” on her 
fi rst day in the NICU that the message was intended 
to be positive. My understanding of “pretty good,” 
though, was orientated to when she might be 
discharged. As I soon realized, the neonatologist 
likely meant she looked good relative to some other 
comparative measure but not that she was close to 
being discharged.
Second, I now fully appreciate the importance 
of consistency with respect to both the content and 
ways in which care providers inform patients or 
their families. It is frustrating for patients or their 
family members to hear one message from care 
providers and then hear what could be perceived as 
an opposite message from another provider—even 
when, in reality, the messages may not oppose each 
other. For example, during our fi rst visit to the 
NICU with our son, the neonatologist told us that 
he “didn’t look too bad.” When he was discharged, 
however, a nurse congratulated us on our son leav-
ing so quickly because “he was really struggling 
when he came in here [sic].” The messages from the 
neonatologist and this nurse do not contradict one 
another. Yet to my wife and me they conveyed two 
different meanings about his admission: the fi rst 
painted his health in a semi–positive light, while 
the second painted his health in a negative light.
My two NICU experiences have also shaped how 
I perform clinical ethics consultations. Whenever I 
meet with a patient or the patient’s surrogate for the 
fi rst time, I try to avoid making any assumptions 
about the information sharing process, or about 
how much or how little information the patient 
or surrogate has or wants regarding the patient’s 
health status. To make such assumptions is tanta-
mount to paternalism. It should not be up to me or 
any other healthcare provider to decide for a patient 
or the patient’s representatives when they receive 
information or the depth of information provided to 
them. When consulted and speaking with a patient 
or the patient’s surrogate for the fi rst time, I ask how 
much information they know about the situation, 
how much information they would like to know 
moving forward, and if there is a preference about 
how often or when updates are provided. To assist 
with my point about consistency in the message, I 
also attempt to make sure that when I speak with 
patients or their surrogates that one of the patient’s 
physicians is present during the conversation. The 
practice of asking patients or their representatives 
to identify their preferences about informative 
communication between them and care providers 
is also something I incorporate into my teaching 
of medical students, residents, fellows, and staff.
There are other important ways my two NICU 
experiences have infl uenced my thinking about 
bioethics and how I perform clinical ethics consulta-
tions. However, the lessons I learned relating to the 
concept of information sharing are the most preva-
lent and common. My hope is that I continue to fi nd 
new ways to use these two experiences as examples 
of the importance information sharing in medicine, 
and that these two experiences continue to help my 
development as a clinical ethicist and father.

Fractured Humerous/ Fractured 
Humor—What a Broken Arm Taught 
Me About Racial and Cultural Privilege 
in Hospital Care
Sara R. Jordan
Some months after the incident, my husband would yell, in a fi t of exasperated rage, “I’m leaving and you look less worried about 
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my leaving than you looked when he broke his 
goddamned arm.” My husband always hated my 
relationship with my training partner as he saw it 
for what it is—an intimate relationship with another 
man. The night Henry had his arm broken, as I tore 
out of my house, to which I had just returned, away 
from my husband to the side of my training part-
ner, I realized just how much I had come to be torn 
between the two intimacies. Throughout the rest of 
the broken arm episode, I came to learn much more 
about the content of the corollary to intimacy—pub-
licity, particularly of the universalist stripe.
It’s been 20 months since Henry suffered a spi-
ral fracture of the humerous, and while the arm is 
healed and no long lasting effects are visible except 
for a lengthy two–centimeter wide scar on his left 
arm, my perceptions of myself as a culturally sensi-
tive ethicist are scarred as well.
Training Partners as Intimate Partners
Raymond Geuss says that an intimate relationship 
is one where we do things around that person that 
would provoke shame in us or reasonable disgust 
in others that were less intimate (2001, pp. 12–33). 
An athletic training partner is an intimate partner in 
ways that a sexual partner cannot be—the intimacy 
of training partners is acted out almost exclusively 
in a public space (e.g., gyms and race courses). Part 
of a long–term, committed, physically, psychologi-
cally, emotionally, fi nancially, and publicly intimate 
relationship, training partners are those people who 
see our souls bare even if they never see us naked.
Henry was then, and is now again, my training 
partner par excellence. We run, lift weights, and 
paddle outrigger canoes together. We support each 
other often in the midst of competing mercilessly 
against one another. To me, he is sanctuary away 
from a diffi cult marriage and diffi cult job where I 
am a minority female working in a culture that I can 
never be part of, and a reminder that things can be 
fun, close and intimate in the middle of otherness. 
Against this background it is easy for even a casual 
observer to understand why, when a mutual friend 
called to say “I think Brad broke Henry’s arm,” I 
was terrifi ed. Looking back, I was not terrifi ed for 
him—how could this person who is seemingly built 
of calm and steady nerves be “broken”—but for 
me. “Oh my God, who am I going to train with?!”
Brad (100+kg) and Henry (75kg) decided to arm 
wrestle drunk, which all orthopaedic surgeons 
know is an unfortunate choice of activities as the 
force of contrary motion often results in a spiral 
fracture to the humerus. I returned to the bar where 
I had left them in a drunken, post–race melee, to 
fi nd Henry a focused lump of clammy, grey skin. 
I cannot remember what we said to one another, if 
anything, people were shouting at me that an ambu-
lance had been called, but I remember looking at his 
eyes, trying to get him to focus on me as he went 
into shock, and, to my own surprise, I still recall 
vividly drawing his head to my chest and kissing 
him on the forehead like I would with a wounded 
child. The feeling was maternal—as he wavered 
in consciousness waiting for the ambulance men 
to arrive—I would have done anything to trade 
places or to take the pain from him. An integral 
part of me was hurt and, hearkening to Gadamer’s 
(1996) description of the intersubjective challenge 
presented by the indescribability of pain, I pained 
to know what he felt so that I could know how to 
alleviate it. Pushing each other, feeling the other’s 
pain, and pushing one another through it is what 
training partners do for one another and at that 
moment, I wanted to perform my usual role.
The contrast between realizing that I am closer 
to my training partner than I originally supposed 
stood in juxtaposition against the realization that, 
while Henry was in the same teaching hospital in 
which I teach Responsible Conduct of Research, 
serve as a member of the institutional review board 
(IRB), and work closely with colleagues in the 
Medical Ethics unit, I am further away from my 
colleagues than I supposed.
Cross–cultural Complexities
Theorists of globalization like Thomas Friedman 
suppose that we are closer together due to global 
connections (2000). Others, like Pankaj Ghemawat 
suppose that closeness is all “globaloney” (2007). 
Throughout the three days of brief interactions 
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with the hospital staff (e.g., nurses, physicians) 
during Henry’s surgery and convalescence, I moved 
distinctly away from the idea of positive, shared 
ethics as Seyla Benhabib (2002) proposes, or the 
inclusiveness that Iris Marion Young supposes is the 
product of close, focused, communication (2000). 
Instead, I moved towards a Diogenean theory of 
cosmopolitical bioethics—if we care for people in 
the specifi c, or we take as important the cultural 
specifi city of other persons, we come to resent their 
difference and seek to fi nd sources of evidence that 
they should be shamed. To be truly universal, we 
must not care at all—we must be shameless (Geuss 
2001, p. 27).
This story, told from the standpoint of almost 
anywhere else, would not have the cultural impli-
cations it does. What complicates this narrative is 
that it occurred in the complicated location of Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong, famed as a gateway to China for 
the West, is a place beset by continuously evolving, 
chaotic, fractal, narratives. Culturally, Hong Kong is 
always, at once, many competing things—sea and 
hills, farms and International Finance/ Commerce 
Centers. We, as part of a large expatriate community, 
live in two worlds populated by intense narrative 
complexity—the English and Chinese speaking, 
but western focused worlds of our careers, and the 
Chinese speaking, multi–cultural pastiche that is 
our athletic world. The Chinese speaking world 
was what arrived on the ambulance and pervaded 
the healthcare sphere. It was the appearance of 
these cultural others to help my friend that started 
me down the path of realization that provokes the 
major point of this article—cross cultural niceties 
and universal inclusion evaporate, even for those 
of us with the knowledge to know and do better, 
when an intimate partner’s health and well–being 
are at risk.
Iris Young describes the idea of Inclusiveness—
generation of shared commitments through mutual 
struggle—as something that is generated through 
communication (2000, pp. 52–80). When we cannot 
communicate suffi ciently with one another—per-
haps we don’t speak the language enough to get 
beyond greeting—there is no open space for includ-
ing one another. And, where there is no inclusion 
of others into our “moral community”, there can 
be no trust (Uslaner 2002, p. 2). Instead, the prod-
uct of stifl ed communication is mutual hesitation, 
frustration, and recrimination. If it is the case that 
one side obtains special privileges because of insuf-
fi cient ability to co–communicate the other side 
will invariably feel negated, put upon, and taken 
advantage of. I am sure the ward staff felt taken 
advantage of, because we could not communicate 
well. I was able to repeatedly violate visiting hours 
rules and access multiple locations that I should 
not have been able to, inevitably due to my English 
speaking whiteness.
In my pre–event mind, taking advantage of 
cultural competencies or tendencies would have 
been wrong. To railroad “others” with whiteness or 
cultural privilege or occupational status would have 
been a repugnant act deserving of moral re–educa-
tion. How could someone not see the demands of 
universal respect at play? My pre–theorization of 
this event would have insisted upon notes and tones 
of gratitude, of a commitment to cross–cultural 
cosmopolitical communicative action that traded 
experiences, expertise, and offers of professional 
assistance in a mutually comprehensible language. 
But, the experience of the event was all otherwise.
My universalist moral commitments were 
dashed by the lack of a universal language. That 
the ambulance men (and they are all men here) 
did not check blood pressure and oxygen satura-
tion on a patient that was clearly in shock, but still 
took time for one to check his phone, rattled my 
professional courtesy. That the radiology techni-
cian did not speak suffi cient English to explain the 
x–ray procedure to my friend irked me. That the 
Accident and Emergency ward nurses were more 
concerned his fee was paid before putting him in 
a more suffi cient sling suggested a lack of genuine 
professional commitment to me. That, once Henry 
was admitted, the ward nurses allowed me in to the 
unit—a large, open plan, shared unit—very late in 
the evening struck me as immediately a violation of 
rules. That they did not explain to him or to me the 
visitation rules, because they could not, provoked 
a sense of moral outrage—what was the content of 
this assumption that expatriates did not come to 
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teaching hospitals? I felt a tone of righteous anger 
when I overheard the nurses chatter to one another 
(in Cantonese) to ask who I was and whether his 
condition could be discussed with me. When they 
failed to grasp the concept “friend,” they listed me 
as girlfriend and attempted to change the next of 
kin status on his chart. I found the ward nurses’ 
heteronormative assumption of male + female = 
sexual union to be evidence of low–learning. And, 
if they did not realize that heterosexuality is non–
compulsory and that Eleatic love is a genuine pos-
sibility, could they possibly know how to properly 
change a dressing, or could they begin to know how 
to properly insert the proposed rods and screws that 
would paste Henry’s arm back together? By the 
conclusion of the fi rst evening, I was convinced that 
the hospital staff was incompetent. I had no clini-
cal evidence of this—I never would have evidence 
of this, as they were fully competent and indeed 
excellent—but the lack of shared communicative 
capacity led me to this specious conclusion.
When Henry emerged from the hospital after 
three days, I was left with a lingering scar as 
well—could I consider myself to be an educated, 
culturally sensitive ethicist any longer, given that I 
had imagined incompetence of the “others” based 
upon the interactive effect of non–shared language 
and, by proxy, race?
Post–Event Theorizing of the Role of 
Bioethicists in Cross–cultural Injury and 
Illness Management
My experience with the injury of my training part-
ner taught me that a love of cosmopolitan theories 
of ethics and bioethics do not equate to a cosmo-
political love applied equally to all. Under times 
of stress, like most humans, I sought the comforts 
of the familiar and resented the discomfort of the 
strange and the incomprehensible. I learned that 
my pretense towards enlightened theory ruptured 
under contrary torsional forces, like those experi-
enced by arm wrestlers, and the resulting spiral 
fracture of my own academic self–image is still 
held together by screws and bars that I am thankful 
cannot be seen without x–ray vision.
In the months following this event, as Henry 
convalesced and rehabilitated in his physical way, I 
turned to the problem of theorizing my experience. 
I had found that shared communicative capacity 
mattered more than I could have imagined for my 
ability to trust professionals of a different linguistic 
group and race. Contrary to Anderson’s theory of 
“imagined communities” of shared professional 
norms and language, I found that ordinary ques-
tions—where are blankets?—mattered more than 
professional communicative capacity—what type 
of post–surgical pain management do you propose? 
As I pondered at greater length my feelings of dis-
trust followed by shame for that distrust, I stopped 
to consider whether there is a role for clinical bio-
ethicists as cross–cultural navigators.
The bioethicists’ role, which I envision as distill-
ing powerful emotive and analytic arguments for 
good and evil and placing those like salve onto 
complex medical situations, maps easily onto the 
role of a cross–cultural navigator. A navigator, or 
an individual trained to cross murky, rough, waters 
by reading the epiphenomenal signs of weather, 
constellations, and winds are those individuals 
that shepherd individuals across in times of dis-
tress. Without pausing to evoke the many images 
of the powerful navigators between the realms of 
life and death, I contend that future bioethics train-
ing ought to have components in cross–cultural 
navigation and communication. Instead of further 
programmatic learning in statistical or survey 
methodologies, students should be encouraged to 
seek culturally immersive internships that teach 
language and culture. Such experiences could 
allow students to come away from their training 
with a deeper cultural understanding as an aspect 
of academic training, which allows them to assist 
family members in cross–cultural negotiation 
situations to know how to apply the reasoning, 
language, and other epiphenomenon of one culture 
to another. Dangerously, though, refl ecting on the 
Diogenean spirit of cosmopolitics described above, 
the consequence of navigating a family through the 
cross–cultural waters might be to bring them to the 
side where they do not care for the differences of the 
staff but care only for their loved one’s co–struggle 
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with difference and illness. By being cosmopo-
litical, we may encourage others to be shamelessly 
particularistic.
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
A Personal Experience of Prenatal Testing 
for Down Syndrome*
By Chris Kaposy
This is the story of the prenatal diagnosis of my son, Aaron, who has Down syndrome. The events in this story happened during 
an important period in my education and devel-
opment as a bioethicist. The decisions that my 
wife Jan and I made through the different stages 
of prenatal testing were infl uenced by what I had 
learned about disability as a bioethicist in training, 
and these experiences have shaped me as a practic-
ing clinical ethicist.
In 2006 I had completed my Ph.D. in philosophy 
with a dissertation on infanticide. This odd topic 
was hard to explain to non–philosophers, who were 
usually relieved to hear that I was opposed to killing 
babies. Much of my intellectual activity while writ-
ing this dissertation was devoted to coming up with 
arguments opposing Peter Singer’s gratuitous use 
of disabilities like Down syndrome in illustrating 
that it is acceptable to kill infants. I had read quite 
a bit of literature on the quality of life of people liv-
ing with disabilities, and the family lives of people 
who have children with disabilities. The evidence 
in both areas was quite different and more positive 
than the doom and gloom about disabilities that you 
fi nd in Singer’s books.
At the end of my Ph.D. in 2006 Jan gave birth to 
our daughter Elizabeth. Early on in the pregnancy, 
we had declined the offer of prenatal testing. Jan 
and I both thought that we could welcome a child 
with disabilities into our lives, so prenatal diagnosis 
would not change anything for us. Though both of 
us were (and are) prochoice, we would not have 
chosen to abort a fetus that tested positive for a 
disability. My feelings were greatly infl uenced by 
my doctoral research and what I had learned about 
cognitive disabilities while studying with my dis-
sertation advisor Eva Feder Kittay, whose daughter 
Sesha has profound disabilities, and who has writ-
ten eloquently about her family life with Sesha.
In 2008 Jan was pregnant again. It was a planned 
pregnancy. As we had done the fi rst time around, 
Jan declined the offer of maternal serum screening 
in our early prenatal visits to the midwife. We were 
planning a home birth. Midwifery care was more 
readily available in other places in Canada, but in 
our province, midwives were just on the cusp of 
being granted hospital privileges.
Around the 19th week of her pregnancy, Jan 
went for a routine ultrasound. I came along. The 
ultrasound was a step we took voluntarily, since we 
wanted to know about any major abnormalities that 
the ultrasound could reveal, and we wanted to have 
a look at the fetus and see the beating heart. Toward 
the end of the procedure, the technician excused 
herself and went to speak briefl y with the radiolo-
gist. She did not explain why. Soon afterward we 
* I owe thanks to my wife Jan for helping me remember the 
details of her pregnancy.
